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LEGISLATING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
A TRIO OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
LAWMAKERS TARGETING FREE EXPRESSION• 
BY CLAY CAL VERT• 
Abstract 
This Article offers three recommendations for lawmakers 
attempting to restrict expression that is presumptively protected by the 
First Amendment. The proposals include: (1) embracing a ''prism of 
protection" through which all potential laws affecting expression are 
filtered prior to drafting; (2) mandating inclusion of sunset clauses in 
all statutes that may detrimentally impact free expression; and (3) 
adopting a comprehensive legislative oversight and review process for 
determining if an expired statute should be renewed, revised or 
abandoned. Although far from creating what Dean Roscoe Pound more 
than 100 years ago called a "science of legislation, " the proposals here 
nonetheless are designed both to improve legislative quality and to 
eliminate ineffective, obsolete or rarely used statutes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article offers three suggestions for lawmakers at all levels­
local, state and federal-seeking to regulate and even criminalize 
speech presumptively protected 1 by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.2 The recommendations advanced here are designed 
to facilitate a quartet of significant objectives: (1) safeguarding speech 
from unnecessary and redundant legal incursions; (2) improving the 
quality of statutes affecting free expression; (3) jettisoning from 
criminal codes outdated, obsolete and/or unnecessary statutes affecting 
speech; and (4) fostering continual legislative oversight, thereby 
expediting statutory revisions when fundamental transformations occur 
with communication technologies, cultural mores or prosecutorial 
priorities. 
The Article's three key proposals are that: 
(1) lawmakers should initially filter all decisions about both
whether and how to craft statutes affecting the First
Amendment freedom of speech through a prism of protection
that entails analyzing a set of five high-level variables;3
(2) all statutes affecting expression, either directly or
incidentally, should necessarily include a sunset clause
pinpointing a date of automatic termination unless lawmakers
choose to renew them;4 and
(3) lawmakers should only renew statutes, either in as-is form
or with modifications and amendments to keep them current
and relevant, after engaging in a comprehensive renew-revise-
I The U.S. Supreme Court has held that some categories of speech are not protected by the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) 
(identifying several unprotected classes of speech, including obscenity, defamation, fraud, 
incitement and speech integral to criminal conduct); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 
234, 245-46 (2002) ("The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories 
of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real 
children."). 
2 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall 
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The 
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than ninety years ago through the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local 
government entities and officials. See generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925). 
3 See infra Part I. 
4 See infra Part II. 
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or-abandon review process accounting for multiple variables 
in the decision-making process.5
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These three proposals are thus sequential. They affect the initial 
drafting of a statute and its gestation (prism of protection), its lifespan 
and death (sunset clause) and its possible-although clearly not 
mandated-legislative resuscitation (renew-revise-or-abandon review 
process). The trio of proposals is therefore simultaneously 
straightforward, yet temporally expansive. 
Perhaps the most significant proposal-that every statute affecting 
free expression includes a sunset provision establishing a fixed date 
when the law automatically expires6-stems partly from my students' 
perpetual surprise when reading the complete terms of the statute at 
issue in Cohen v. California.7 The U.S. Supreme Court in Cohen 
upheld Paul Robert Cohen's right to wear a jacket emblazoned with the 
carnally provocative phrase "Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse corridor in 
1968 "as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings 
against the Vietnam War and the draft."8 Cohen was convicted of 
violating a facet of California Penal Code § 415 that prohibited 
"offensive conduct."9
But the full statute then in effect and adopted back in 1872 10-just 
one year shy of a full century before the Supreme Court ruled in 
Cohen-regulated much more than that. Among other items, it targeted 
running horse races on public streets and highways, as well as using 
"indecent language within the presence or hearing of women or 
children, in a loud and boisterous manner." 11 These antiquated 
provisions, including the gender-biased provision shielding women, but 
not men, from indecent speech, are no longer found in what remains of 
a much-truncated California Penal Code§ 415 today.12
s See infra Part III. 
6 See John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to 
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1784 (2003) ("A sunset clause is the 
enacting legislature's choice to limit the scope of its action temporally, not to restrict the power of 
any future legislature to act as it sees fit."). 
7 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
s Id. at 16. Somewhat correcting this long-received historical truth during a 2016 interview, 
Cohen acknowledged he "didn't even see the wording on the jacket until the morning before [he] 
was headed to court to testify on behalf of an acquaintance" and explained he "wasn't trying to 
make a political statement." David L. Hudson Jr., Paul Robert Cohen and "His" Famous Free­
Speech Case, NEWSEUM INST. (May 4, 2016), http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2016/05/04/paul­
robert -co hen-and-his-famous-free-speech-case. 
9 CAL. PENAL CODE§ 415 (1971). 
10 See People v. Cohen, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) ("Section 415 when enacted 
in 1872 was a codification of the existing common law crime of breach of the peace."). 
11 See Cohen, 403 U.S. 16, n.1 (setting forth the complete terms of California Penal Code§ 415 
that was then in effect). 
12 The statute now provides: 
Any of the following persons shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for 
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Other outdated artifacts embodying erstwhile legislative frets and 
anxieties over the supposed dangers of free expression-many of which 
are or were rarely enforced-abound. 13 Some, like Alabama's statute
prohibiting the sale of vibrators14 as obscene15 devices, have even
survived judicial challenges rather than been extinguished by legislative 
fiat from the criminal code. 16 
Indeed, the mounting problem of "legal obsolescence," 17 stemming
largely from "[t]he 'statutorification' of American law,"18 was well
catalogued by federal appellate court judge19 and former Yale Law
School Dean Guido Calabresi thirty-five years ago. Calabresi noted 
then that sunset laws "are designed to help existing legislatures 
a period of not more than 90 days, a fine of not more than four hundred dollars ($400), 
or both such imprisonment and fine: (1) Any person who unlawfully fights in a public 
place or challenges another person in a public place to fight. (2) Any person who 
maliciously and willfully disturbs another person by loud and unreasonable noise. (3) 
Any person who uses offensive words in a public place which are inherently likely to 
provoke an immediate violent reaction. 
CAL. PENAL CODE§ 415 (Deering 2016). 
13 Closely akin to the gender-biased (protecting women) and age-centric (protecting children) 
portion of the law at issue in Cohen, but in a much more recent case, a Michigan appellate court 
in 2002 considered the constitutionality of a Great Lakes State statute which provided that "[a]ny 
person who shall use any indecent, immoral, obscene, vulgar or insulting language in the 
presence or hearing of any woman or child shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Michigan v. 
Boomer, 655 N.W.2d 255, 257 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). The statute's origins dated back more 
than 100 years to 1897. Id. The appellate court observed that "[t]hroughout the one hundred plus 
years of its existence, there have been no published Michigan cases addressing the statute." Id. 
The court declared the statute unconstitutional due to its vagueness, remarking that "it would be 
difficult to conceive of a statute that would be more vague." Id. at 258. A key problem with the 
statute, the court reasoned, was that "[t]here is no restrictive language whatsoever contained in 
the statute that would limit or guide a prosecution for indecent, immoral, obscene, vulgar, or 
insulting language." Id. at 258-59. 
14 See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(l )  (2016) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to 
knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any obscene 
material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human 
genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value.") ( emphasis added). 
1s Obscenity is one of the few categories of expression not protected by the First Amendment's 
guarantee of free speech. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (writing that 
"obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press"). The Court's 
current three-part test for obscenity, which was created in Miller v. California, asks the factfinder 
to determine if the material in question: (1) appeals to a prurient interest in sex, when taken as a 
whole and as judged by contemporary community standards from the perspective of the average 
person; (2) is patently offensive, as defined by state law; and (3) "lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
16 See Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 814 
(2007) (upholding Alabama's law banning the sale of sex toys, in the face of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's ruling in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), because "public morality remains a 
legitimate rational basis for the challenged legislation even after Lawrence"). 
17 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982). 
1s Id. at 1. 
19 See Judges: Guido Calabresi, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, 
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/judges/bios/gc.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) ("Judge Calabresi 
was appointed United States Circuit Judge in July 1994, and entered into duty on September 16, 
1994. Prior to his appointment, he was Dean and Sterling Professor at the Yale Law School 
where he began teaching in 1959."). 
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overcome inertia. Their object is to avoid statutory middle age either by 
continuous rejuvenation or sudden death."20 In brief, as he encapsulated 
it, sunset clauses strive to ensure that "legislative inertia will no longer 
serve the dead hand of the past."21
It was Calabresi, Melissa Mitchell writes, who "first recognized 
both the obsolescence of statutes as a growing problem and that 
legislative processes tend to be an impediment to solving the 
problem."22 The harms of leaving such statutes on the books­
particularly criminal statutes-are clear. As current Jenner & Block 
partner Terri Mascherin and her colleagues asserted in 2008: 
The retention of outdated statutes that are never enforced undermines 
society's confidence in the criminal justice system, as the public 
knows that some provisions in the Code simply will not be enforced. 
An ideal criminal code should reflect the norms of modern society 
and include laws that society cares to enforce.23
Any piece of legislation captures only the concerns, agonies and 
worries of lawmakers, their constituents and, perhaps, the news media at 
a single point in time, akin to a static legislative snapshot rather than a 
continually unspooling reel of film. University of Chicago Law School 
Professor Grant Gilmore colorfully explained fifty years ago that "[i]t is 
an occupational hazard of a draftsman, as he lovingly embalms the past, 
to fail to see what is going on before his own eyes"24 and that "[ o ]ur 
best informed guesses about what is going to happen next have an 
uncomfortable habit of missing the mark completely."25 The benefit of 
sunset clauses thus is rendered clear, especially where a constitutional 
freedom such as expression hangs in the balance. 
By way of comparison, the impetus for the first proposal­
legislative adoption of a prism of protection-flows partly from the fact 
that a bevy of legislative handiwork aimed at thwarting First 
Amendment speech rights recently has been struck down by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Witness, for example and in chronological order 
starting in just 2010, the cases of Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,26 United States v. Stevens,27 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,28
20 CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 7. 
21 Id. at 60. 
22 Melissa J. Mitchell, Cleaning Out the Closet: Using Sunset Provisions to Clean Up Cluttered 
Criminal Codes, 54 EMORY L.J. 1671, 1695 (2005). 
23 Terri L. Mascherin et al., Reforming the Illinois Criminal Code: Where the Clear Commission 
Stopped Short of Its Goals, 41 J. MARSHALLL. REV. 741, 744 (2008). 
24 Grant Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 461,468 (1967). 
2s Id. at 467. 
26 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Co='n, 558 U.S. 310, 318-19 (2010) (declaring 
unconstitutional, on First Amendment grounds, part of a federal statute that banned "corporations 
and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech 
defined as an 'electioneering co=unication' or for speech expressly advocating the election or 
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Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,29 United States v. 
Alvarez,30 McCullen v. Coakley,31 Harris v. Quinn,32 and Reed v. Town 
of Gilbert.33 Each involved a statute declared unconstitutional for 
flouting the First Amendment. 34 Although it certainly is good-· at least 
from a pro-free speech perspective-that these laws were invalidated, 
shoddy draftsmanship of any kind serves no function in the long run, 
clogging courts with cases and squandering taxpayers' money m 
defense costs. 
Finally, the incentive for the third proposal, which requires a 
comprehensive review before a statute is revised or renewed, stems 
partially from the fact that statutes affecting free expression often are 
adopted in the wake of what might be considered moral panics and then 
are rarely used when the worry subsides or the issue fades from the 
spotlight of media attention. Consider, for instance, sexting35 by minors 
and the panic it created only a few years ago. 36 
defeat of a candidate"). 
27 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464 (2010) (striking down, on First Amendment 
grounds of overbreadth, a federal statute criminalizing "the commercial creation, sale, or 
possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty"). 
28 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557, 580 (2011) (declaring unconstitutional, on First 
Amendment free speech grounds, a state statute that restricted "the sale, disclosure, and use of 
pharmacy records that reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors" and remarking that 
"the State cannot engage in content-based discrimination to advance its own side of a debate"). 
29 Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 788 (2011) (striking down, on First Amendment 
grounds for failing to pass constitutional muster under the strict scrutiny standard of judicial 
review, a California statute "imposing restrictions on violent video games" preventing their sale 
or rental to minors). 
30 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (declaring unconstitutional, on First 
Amendment grounds of being an impermissible content-based restriction of speech, a portion of 
the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2005 that made it a crime to utter a "false statement made at any 
time, in any place, to any person" about winning a Congressional Medal of Honor). 
31 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2525 (2014) (finding unconstitutional, in contravention 
of the First Amendment guarantee of free speech, a Massachusetts statute that made "it a crime to 
knowingly stand on a 'public way or sidewalk' within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any 
place, other than a hospital, where abortions are performed") (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 266, §§ 120E½(a), (b) (West 2012)). 
32 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2623, 2644 (2014) (holding unconstitutional, on First 
Amendment grounds, a state statute requiring "personal care providers to subsidize speech on 
matters of public concern by a union that they do not wish to join or support," in light of "the 
bedrock principle that, except perhaps in the rarest of circumstances, no person in this country 
may be compelled to subsidize speech by a third party that he or she does not wish to support"). 
33 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2221 (2015) (declaring unconstitutional, for failure 
to pass the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review, a municipal ordinance that prohibited "the 
display of outdoor signs without a permit, but" carved out twenty-three categories of signs for 
exemption). 
34 See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. 
35 Sexting is "a portmanteau of 'sex' and 'texting' describing the transmission of sexually explicit 
photographs via cellular phones or over the Internet." Matthew H. Birkhold, Freud on the Court: 
Re-interpreting Sexting & Child Pornography Laws, 23 FORDHAM lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 897, 903 (2013).
36 Robert H. Wood, The First Amendment Implications of Sexting at Public Schools: A Quandary
for Administrators Who Intercept Visual Lave Notes, 18 J.L. & POL'Y 701, 708 (2010)
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As Professor Kimberlianne Podlas describes it, the media played a 
major role in "constructing the teen sexting epidemic[,]"37 starting with 
"headlines in March 2009. "38 She asserts that "[b ]y reporting sexting as
child pornography and as an act that could result in criminal 
prosecution, the media helped make this society's dominant framework 
for understanding what teen sexting was, what the behavior meant, and 
what consequences were possible."39 This, in tum, ignited a legislative 
firestorm across the nation to create statutes affecting sexting by 
minors.40
Yet, as I argue elsewhere, "[ o ]ver time, sexting laws may be 
amended to address situations unforeseen by lawmakers or to bring 
them into line with shifting societal conceptions of what constitutes 
punishable behavior."41 In fact, as Professor Albert Grudzinskas and his 
colleagues contend, if sexting today is a part of "normal developmental 
growth, then criminalizing the conduct may indeed result in long-term 
harm to the individuals, to their families and the communities, and to 
society as a whole."42
With this Introduction in mind, Part I next elaborates on the 
creation of a prism of protection through which all proposed statutes 
affecting free expression must be filtered.43 Part II then defends the 
proposal for mandating sunset provisions in all statutes adversely 
affecting free expression. 44 Next, Part III addresses the review process 
through which all statutes that sunset must be analyzed before they can 
be renewed in either existing or amended form.45 Finally, Part IV 
concludes by acknowledging possible shortcomings in the three-tiered 
framework proposed in this article, but nonetheless contends that 
adoption of even just one of the three facets would mark a significant 
(addressing "[t]he panic over sexting"). 
37 Kimberlianne Podlas, Media Activity and Impact, in SEXTING AND YOUTH: A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY EXAMINATION OF RESEARCH, THEORY, AND LAW 123, 136 (Todd C. 
Hiestand & W. Jesse Weins eds., 2014). 
38 Id. at 137. 
39 Id. at 141. 
40 See Susan Hanley Duncan, Child Pornography Statutes and New Legislation, in SEXTING AND 
YOUTH: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EXAMINATION OF RESEARCH, THEORY, AND LAW 177, 177 
(Todd C. Hiestand & W. Jesse Weins eds., 2014) ("In 2012, at least thirteen states proposed 
legislation dealing with your sexting. Since 2009, nineteen states have passed some law specific 
to youth sexting."). 
41 Clay Calvert, Youth-Produced Sexual Images, "Sexting," and the Cellphone, in ADOLESCENT 
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR CLINICIANS, LEGAL 
PROFESSIONALS, AND EDUCATORS 89, 113 (Fabian M. Saleh et al. eds., 2014). 
42 Albert J. Grudzinskas, Jr. et al., New Technology Meets Old Law, in ADoLESCENT SEXUAL 
BEHAVIOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR CLINICIANS, LEGAL PROFESSIONALS, 
AND EDUCATORS 3, 19 (Fabian M. Saleh et al. eds., 2014). 
43 See infra Part I. 
44 See infra Part II. 
45 See infra Part Ill. 
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step forward in helping to preserve First Amendment rights.46
I. DRAFTING LAWS THROUGH A PRISM OF PROTECTION: KEY
CONSIDERATIONS FOR SAFEGUARDING FREE EXPRESSION
The suggestions identified in this Part for lawmakers to consider 
when drafting statutes affecting free expression go beyond merely 
knowing well-established doctrines such as strict scrutiny,47
intermediate scrutiny,48 vagueness49 and overbreadth.50 Legislators or 
their staff attorneys, of course, should know these tests and standards; 
that much is a given, regardless of whether they do, in fact, understand 
the legal basics. But telling lawmakers and staff attorneys simply to 
know the law or to draft with clarity and precision merely states the 
obvious. Similarly, instructing them to follow the rules of the bill­
drafting manuals now enforced in thirty-seven states does little good.51
46 See infra Part N. 
47 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (observing that strict scrutiny 
requires the government to prove that a statute "furthers a compelling governmental interest and 
is narrowly tailored to that end"), Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665--66 
(2015) (noting that to survive strict scrutiny, the government must prove that "a speech restriction 
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest"); see also United States v. Playboy Entm't 
Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (asserting that a content-based speech restriction can only 
withstand judicial review "if it satisfies strict scrutiny," opining that "[i]f a statute regulates 
speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government 
interest," and adding that "if a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, 
the legislature must use that alternative"). 
48 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrntiny in First 
Amendment Jurisprndence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 801 (asserting that under the U.S. Supreme 
Court's more recent articulations of intermediate scrutiny, "laws will be upheld so long as they 
serve some sort of a significant/substantial/important governmental interest and are reasonably 
well tailored to that purpose (i.e., not unreasonably overbroad)"), Leslie Kendrick, Nonsense on 
Sidewalks: Content Discrimination in McCullen v. Coakley, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 238 (2014) 
(observing that the intermediate scrutiny standard "has historically required that the law be 
'narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest' and that it leave open 'ample 
alternative channels of communication"') (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 
791 (1989)). 
49 The U.S. Supreme Court explained in 2008 that the: 
[v]agueness doctrine is an outgrowth not of the First Amendment, but of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A conviction fails to comport with due
process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); see also Johnson v. United States, 135 S. 
Ct. 2551, 2556-2561 (2015) (addressing when a law is unconstitutionally vague, and observing 
that a criminal statute is unconstitutional when it is "so vague that it fails to give ordinary people 
fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement"). 
50 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 (providing that under "our First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech"); see 
also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118 (2003) ("The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth 
is an exception to our normal rule regarding the standards for facial challenges."). 
51 See Grace E. Hart, State Legislative Drqfting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 126 YALE 
L.J. 438, 443 (2016) ("Thirty-seven states' offices publish bill drafting manuals that are available
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Instead, the prism of protection proposed here offers higher-level 
principles-macro-level considerations-that nonetheless tap into 
established legal doctrines. The overarching question guiding 
lawmakers through this analytical prism simply is this: Does society, 
including both individuals who want to speak and those who want either 
to be shielded from speech or to shield others from it, turn out 
appreciably better by enactment of the proposed legislation? More 
cynically put, legislators must ask if a proposed statute constitutes 
meaningless, "feel-good legislation[52] with no practical import[,]"53 as
Professors Neil Buchanan and Michael Dorf put it, or a measure that 
actually achieves a greater good. As UCLA Professor Eugene Volokh 
avers, "ill-considered feel-good legislation [may] jeopardize[] important 
constitutional principles."54 One of those important constitutional
principles that should not be jeopardized, of course, is free speech. 
To facilitate answers to these questions, to strive to ensure that 
lawmaking is more than just a metaphorical "black box out of which a 
text somehow emerges"55 and, in turn, to assist lawmakers in crafting
virtuous statutes that are more than fluffy feel-good efforts, the prism of 
protection requires lawmakers to: (1) identify, with precision and 
specificity, the actual problem that the speech caught in the legislative 
crosshairs allegedly causes;56 (2) find competent and reliable evidence57 
to the public and contain a prescribed set of drafting instructions on formatting, grammar, word 
choice, and style."). 
52 Cf Clay Calvert, Imus, Indecency, Violence & Vulgarity: Why the FCC Must Not Expand Its 
Authority Over Content, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 29 (2007) (asserting that calls in 
2007 for the Federal Communications Commission to control violent images on television 
amounted to "little more than a superficial, feel-good Band-Aid placed on a much more immense 
and difficult-to-deal-with problem of real-life violence that will continue to fester"), Clay Calvert, 
The First Amendment, the Media and the Culture Wars: Eight Important Lessons From 2004 
About Speech, Censorship, Science and Public Policy, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 325, 336 (2005) 
( contending that legislation targeting violent video games may pay off for politicians in terms of 
favorable news media coverage "during the feel-good holiday season when parents are busy 
purchasing toys for their children, but it sacrifices free speech rights at the altar of good press 
coverage"). 
53 Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Don't End or Audit the Fed: Central Bank 
Independence in an Age of Austerity, 102 CORNELLL. REV. 1, 51 (2016). 
54 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 
SUP. Cr. REV. 141, 159, n.57. 
55 Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 74 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1567 (1988) (reviewing WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIPP. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND 
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988)). 
56 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) ("There must be a direct causal link 
between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented."), Brown v. Entm't Merchs. 
Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (holding that the government "must specifically identify an 
'actual problem' in need of solving") (emphasis added). 
57 This principle borrows from the Federal Trade Commission's requirement that a health-related 
advertising claim must satisfy this level of evidence. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. NPB Advert., 
Inc., No. 8:14-CV-1155-T-23TGW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151840, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 
2016) ("If the FTC alleges that a claim lacks competent and reliable substantiation, the defendant 
must produce the evidence on which he relied for substantiation.") (emphasis added). See also 
288 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 35:279 
that demonstrates "a direct causal link:"58 between the speech in question
and the problem or harm it supposedly produces; (3) determine the 
scope of the alleged problem-whether a call for legislation is spurred 
by a single, albeit perhaps high-profile, incident59 ( one likely garnering
massive media attention, but that may be an exceptionally rare 
occurrence) or whether the problem occurs frequently-and closely 
analyze both the size and the significance of the negative effect; (4) 
examine alternative methods of remedying the supposed problem that 
may restrict less expression, 60 as well as possible existing remedies
already codified or embraced in common law, so as not to create 
redundant and unnecessary legislation;61 and (5) attempt to predict the
efficacy of the proposed legislation in remedying the supposed problem 
caused by speech-in other words, will the statute really work or does it 
accomplish far too little so as to be rendered fatally underinclusive62 and 
Porn Wonderful, LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 777 F.3d 478, 502 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting a 
"categorical floor of two" randomized and controlled human clinical trials to satisfy the minimal 
level for competent and reliable scientific evidence). 
58 See Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 (asserting there must be "a direct causal link" between the speech 
and alleged harm in order for a statute to pass strict scrutiny review). 
59 An obvious example of this is California's adoption of the California Privacy Protection Act of 
1998-a so-called anti-paparazzi statute-in the wake of the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. 
See CAL. CN. CODE § 1708.8 (Deering 2016) (setting forth the terms of this statute, which has 
been amended several times to expand its reach); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting 
Privacy from Technological Intrnsions, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 183, 190 ("Critics of the statute 
refer to it as anti-paparazzi legislation, but this characterization is incorrect. The statute does not 
single out paparazzi for regulation."), Robert M. O'Neil, Ride-Alongs, Paparazzi, and Other 
Media Threats to Privacy, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1167, 1168--69 (2000) (noting that California's 
anti-paparazzi statute was "directly responsive" to "the tragic death of Princess Diana"), Gary 
Wax, Popping Britney's Personal Safety Bubble: Why Proposed Anti-Paparazzi Ordinances in 
Los Angeles Cannot Withstand First Amendment Scrutiny, 30 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 133, 134 
(2009) ("A year after Princess Diana's death, and then again in 2005, California enacted civil 
privacy torts in an attempt to deter aggressive paparazzi, but no criminal law is yet in place."). 
60 This reflects the U.S. Supreme Court's doctrine requiring courts to consider if there are 
alternative methods of remedying the speech-based problem in question that require or involve 
fewer restrictions on expression than the remedy under scrutiny. See United States v. Playboy 
Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) ("If a less restrictive alternative would serve the 
Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.") (emphasis added), Sable 
Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("The Government may, however, regulate the 
content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses 
the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.") (emphasis added). See also Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2417, 2422 (1996) ("A law is not narrowly tailored if there are less speech-restrictive
means available that would serve the interest essentially as well as would the speech restriction.")
(emphasis added).
61 For example, California's anti-paparazzi statute addressed supra note 59 aptly has been
described as "legislative overkill" and "not even necessary." C. Thomas Dienes, Protecting
Investigative Journalism, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (1999). See Richard J. Curry, Jr.,
Diana's Law, Celebrity and the Paparazzi: The Continuing Search for a Solution, 18 J.
MARsHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 945, 961 (2000) ("Anti-paparazzi statutes proposed at the
federal level and enacted by the state of California, while well intentioned are not needed. There
are already laws against stalking and harassment currently in affect [sic] that celebrities can use to
effectively deal with paparazzi photographers who intrude upon their privacy.").
62 See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668-70 (2015) (noting that
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futile?63
These five facets of the First Amendment-grounded prism of 
protection through which proposed speech-restricting measures should 




( 4) remedial alternatives; and
(5) remedial efficacy.
How might this quintet of seemingly simple factors apply in the 
real world? Consider, for example, the spate of ill-fated statutes 
targeting violent video games and minors' access to them that sprouted 
up like weeds during the initial decade of the twenty-first century.64 
Had lawmakers originally considered such legislation through the prism 
of protection, they likely would have spotted some of the flaws and 
perhaps-but for political opportunism or other motives-might not 
have pressed forward with the measures. Indeed, as described below, 
the U.S. Supreme Court's 2011 decision Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association65 ably illustrates all five facets of the prism of 
protection. 
A. Problem Identification
Just as "clarity is a drafting virtue,"66 clarity in identifying the 
precise problem under legislative attack-a precursor step before any 
drafting actually begins-also is a virtue. In cases like Brown, 
underinclusiveness can "reveal that a law does not actually advance a compelling interest," and 
adding that "[u]nderinclusivity creates a First Amendment concern when the State regulates one 
aspect of a problem while declining to regulate a different aspect of the problem that affects its 
stated interest in a comparable way") (emphasis in original). 
63 Substantially underinclusive statutes----ones failing to achieve their alleged interest( s )­
coincide with what Professor Eric Easton calls "the futility principle" in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. Eric B. Easton, Closing the Barn Door After the Genie is Out of the Bag: 
Recognizing a "Futility Principle" in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 35 
(1995). 
64 See generally Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Violence and Video Games 2006: 
Legislation and Litigation, 8 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 49, 61 (2007) (describing state 
legislation targeting violent video games that was enjoined for violating the First Amendment in 
states including California, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota and Oklahoma, and 
concluding that "lawmakers must finally take seriously the repeated admonitions of the judiciary 
against the validity of statutes imposing labeling requirements on violent video games and 
limiting minors' access to them"). 
65 Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass 'n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011 ). 
66 Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional 
Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 594 (2002). 
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lawmakers arguably faced difficulties pinpointing exactly what the 
problem was with violent video games. Was it, for example, that 
minors somehow would become more aggressive after playing violent 
video games? Or that minors would actually engage in violence­
aggression and violence not necessarily being the same thing67-after 
playing them? Or, perhaps, that minors who play violent video games 
simply would become psychologically desensitized to real-world 
violence and therefore somehow more callous and coldhearted to it, 
whether or not they later actually engaged in either aggression or 
violence?68
As one who wrote about the issue on several occasions, my 
opinion is that it never really was clear to lawmakers which particular 
problem they were truly targeting, other than, perhaps, one to gain 
voters' support. 69 The first step of the prism of protection for free 
speech thus requires lawmakers to pinpoint the precise harm, not just 
some generalized, indistinct worry. 
B. Problem Causation
The second step of the prism, in tum, calls on lawmakers, after 
having identified the precise problem, to locate competent and reliable 
evidence and data proving that the speech under criticism, in fact, 
directly causes that problem. 70 Ignoring this step turned out to be fatal 
67 See STEVEN J. KIRsH, CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS, AND MEDIA VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL LOOK 
AT THE RESEARCH 10 (2d ed. 2012) (defining aggression as "any behavior intended to cause 
physical, emotional, or psychological injury to another human being," noting that violence 
generally is "reserved for extreme acts of aggression, acts that lead to significant physical or 
psychological harm," and emphasizing that "[t]he distinction between aggressions and violence .. 
. is a subtle one"). 
68 See, e.g., Bruce D. Bartholow et al., Chronic Violent Video Game Exposure and 
Desensitization to Violence: Behavioral and Event-Related Brain Potential Data, 42 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 532, 537 (2006) (contending that "exposure to violent video 
games leads to desensitization" and finding that such desensitization stemming from "repeated 
exposure to violent video games is reflected in the brain as blunted evaluative categorization of 
violent stimuli"). 
69 See, e.g., Calvert & Richards, supra note 64, Clay Calvert, The Two-Step Evidentiary and 
Causation Quandary for Medium-Specific Laws Targeting Sexual and Violent Content: First 
Proving Harm and Injury to Silence Speech, then Proving Redress and Rehabilitation Through 
Censorship, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 157, 160-61 (2008) (noting, among other points regarding 
regulation of violent video games, that "a statute that regulates and limits minors' access to 
violent video games because such images and plots ostensibly harm the children who play those 
games fails to cure whatever problem may exist from viewing violence generally because minors 
still can watch violent images on" multiple platforms, including television, the Internet, movies 
and real world), Clay Calvert, The First Amendment, the Media and the Culture Wars: Eight 
Important Lessons From 2004 About Speech, Censorship, Science and Public Policy, 41 CAL. W. 
L. REV. 325, 334-37 (2005) (asserting that, when it comes to violent video games, some
politicians "never seem to let judicial precedent, grounded in constitutional concerns for the First
Amendment protection of free speech, get in the way of proposing new legislation that has a slim­
to-none chance of standing up in court," and arguing that politicians adopt a "precedent be
damned" stance when it comes to regulating such games).
10 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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for the statutes aimed at violent video games. As the U.S. Supreme 
Court wrote in striking down California's violent video game statute in 
Brown, the Golden State failed to "show a direct causal link between 
violent video games and harm to minors."71 The late Antonin Scalia,
writing for the five-justice Brown majority, made it clear that a mere 
correlation between speech and harm was insufficient for the 
government to win the day. Instead, it must demonstrate causation.72 
In brief, before moving a bill forward that targets speech, lawmakers 
should rely on more than just their intuition, hunches, and gut feelings 
about whether the speech, in fact, is harmful. Instead, they must have 
data demonstrating causation. If such data do not exist, then lawmakers 
would do well to abandon the bill. 
C. Problem Magnitude
Problem magnitude asks lawmakers to answer two questions: (1) 
Scope----/s the alleged speech-caused problem widespread and 
recurring?, and (2) Size and Significance-What is the actual size and 
significance of the negative effect purportedly caused by the speech? 
In resolving the first query, lawmakers should consider, among 
other things, if the bill under consideration was prompted by a lone 
incident or whether data demonstrate that the problem occurs 
repeatedly. For example, many of the bills targeting violent video 
games seemingly were sparked by the massive media attention paid to a 
· few high-profile incidents where minors involved in school shootings
had played violent video games. 73 In other words, the raft of video
11 564 U.S. at 799 (2011). 
72 See id. at 800 (remarking that the studies relied upon by California lawmakers "purport to 
show a connection between exposure to violent video games and harmful effects on children," but 
"do not prove that violent video games cause minors to act aggressively (which would at least be 
a beginning)[,]" and that the studies California relied upon "show at best some correlation 
between exposure to violent entertainment and minuscule real-world effects, such as children's 
feeling more aggressive or making louder noises in the few minutes after playing a violent game 
than after playing a nonviolent game"); see generally Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, An 
"Actual Problem" in First Amendment Jurisprudence? Examining the Immediate Impact of 
Brown's Proof-of-Causation Doctrine on Free Speech and Its Compatibility with the Marketplace 
Theory, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 391 (2013) (addressing the importance of the 
difference between causation and correlation within the context of the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Brown). 
73 See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, The Irony of News Coverage: How the Media Harm 
Their Own First Amendment Rights, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 215, 218 (2002) 
( contending that "a sporadic number of school shootings" helped to keep "media attention and, in 
turn, public and legislative attention focused on the allegedly harmful effects of media products 
on youths[,]" and asserting that "massive media coverage of school shootings has created a false 
perception-a perception, in this case, that school violence is escalating rapidly and that media 
products are directly responsible for this disquieting phenomenon"), Clay Calvert, Violence, 
Video Games, and a Voice of Reason: Judge Posner to the Defense of Kids' Culture and the First 
Amendment, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 22 (2002) (asserting that "[m]edia claims that video games 
may contribute to youth violence enhance and foster an ideal climate for the creation of 
legislation"). 
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game statutes might be considered an overreaction by lawmakers, or, 
even less charitably, feel-good legislation to make constituents believe 
their representatives were taking some action. 
The rush to legislate often is driven as much by the personal 
interests of politicians as it is by societal needs. 74 Professor Podlas 
explains that: 
hoping to address or cure an emerging social concern, policymakers 
may rush to legislate or get caught up in the fever of a legislative 
trend. This leads to a legislative outbreak. Unfortunately, opting for 
speed over logical review of an issue can worsen the underlying 
problem, if there even is one, create a new one, or result in needless 
legislation. 75
This is not to say, of course, that lawmakers should ignore a few 
high-prolife incidents that may indicate a larger social problem that 
needs to be addressed. Rather, they would do well to heed the words of 
legendary former UCLA basketball coach John Wooden: "Be quick­
but don't hurry."76
As to the second question regarding problem magnitude-the size 
and real-world significance of the effect of the harm supposedly caused 
by violent video games-Justice Scalia pointed out in Brown that even 
assuming, for the sake of argument, "that violent video games produce 
some effect on children's feelings of aggression, those effects are both 
small and indistinguishable from effects produced by other media."77
Scalia added that the researcher California relied on for most its studies 
"admits that the same effects have been found when children watch 
cartoons starring Bugs Bunny or the Road Runner ... or when they play 
video games like Sonic the Hedgehog that are rated "E " (appropriate for 
all ages)."78 In a nutshell, when it came to addressing the magnitude of 
the harm stemming from violent video games, lawmakers arguably not 
only overreacted to a few attention-grabbing incidents, but also 
overestimated the actual size and significance of the harm caused by 
playing them. Thus, speech-based harms that either occur exceedingly 
74 As attorney Roy Bussewitz explains, "(a]ll politicians want publicity, so there is often a rush to 
be the author or co-sponsor of new legislation, which helps to assure media coverage. However, 
there is often a downside to the rush to legislate. Laws are often not written as well as they might 
be." Roy J. Bussewitz, OBRA '90-Its Impact on the Chain Drug Store Industry, I J. PHARMACY 
&L. 117,118 (1992). 
75 Kimberlianne Podlas, The "Legal Epidemiology" of the Teen Sexting Epidemic: How the 
Media Influenced a Legislative Outbreak, 12 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y I, 40 (2011). 
76 See Keith Joseph Fernandez, Note, Be Quick-But Don't Hurry: Competing Purposes of the 
Federal Arbitration Act and Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, 70 LA. L. REV. 387, 387 (2009) 
(noting that this adage is "attributed to the great basketball coach, John Wooden" and asserting 
that "Coach Wooden was likely trying to teach his players to play both fast and confident while 
avoiding the mistakes that accompany rushing"). 
77 Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 800-01 (2011). 
1s Id. at 801. 
2017] LEGISLATING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 293 
rarely or that are of minimal, if not infinitesimal, real-world size and 
significance do not merit legislative attention. 
D. Remedial Alternatives
This variable features two components. The first, which taps into 
concerns about narrow tailoring that affects statutes under both strict 
scrutiny79 and intermediate scrutiny, 80 asks lawmakers to consider 
whether there are alternative ways of mitigating or eliminating the 
alleged harm that restrict less expression than the bill under 
consideration. The second component requires lawmakers to determine 
if alternative legal remedies for addressing the harm already, in fact, 
exist and thus whether the bill under consideration simply is 
unnecessary and scarcely more than legislative overkill. 8 1 
In Brown, Justice Scalia pointed out that the Entertainment 
Software Rating Board, working in conjunction with the Video 
Software Dealers Association, provided an effective, non-governmental 
way of protecting minors. As the late justice put it, the rating "system 
does much to ensure that minors cannot purchase seriously violent 
games on their own, and that parents who care about the matter can 
readily evaluate the games their children bring home. "82 In other words, 
an alternative remedy to government censorship-an efficacious one at 
that-already existed. 
Although Brown does not illustrate the second component of the 
remedial alternatives prong of the prism of protection, an even more 
timely example of legislation demonstrates the fact that lawmakers 
should consider whether alternative remedies are already on the books 
before they move new bills forward. Specifically, many states are now 
rushing to pass statutes targeting drones in order to protect privacy. 83 
Yet, this occurs while multiple civil remedies-trespass84 and intrusion 
79 See supra note 47. 
80 See supra note 48. 
8I See supra note 59 and accompanying text (contending that California's anti-paparazzi statute is 
an example of legislative overkill). 
82 Brown, 564 U.S. at 803. 
83 See Michael N. Widener, Local Regulating of Drone Activity in Lower Airspace, 22 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 239, 241 (2016) ("More than twenty states approved drone laws in 2015, as have 
major cities like Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, and Santa Clara. Many of these new regulations 
place tough restrictions on areas where over flight is permitted and clamp down on drones used to 
invade the privacy of residential neighbors."). 
84 See A. Michael Froomkin & P. Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots and Drones, 48 
CONN. L. REV. 1, 15-23 (2015) (defining trespass as "an intentional entry onto an owner's land or 
property without her permission[,]" noting that the "starting point for determining what 
constitutes an aerial trespass is determining the extent of the airspace covered by a landowner's 
right to exclude others[,]" and contending "that landowners should be able to claim a freedom 
from drone overflight in at least some portion of their airspace. The questions are how high, and 
who sets the boundaries"). 
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into seclusion, 85 for instance-that sufficiently safeguard personal
privacy from drones already exist, even when those devices are 
involved in gathering news. 86
E. Remedial Efficacy
This factor, as noted above, taps into the underinclusivity 
doctrine. 87 Underinclusive statutes are ineffective in combating the evil
and serving the interest they supposedly address because they deal with 
far too little of the underlying problem.88
This principle too is illustrated by the violent video games statute 
at issue in Brown. As Justice Scalia pointed out there: 
California has (wisely) declined to restrict Saturday morning 
cartoons, the sale of games rated for young children, or the 
distribution of pictures of guns. The consequence is that its 
regulation is wildly underinclusive when judged against its asserted 
justification, which in our view is alone enough to defeat it. 
Underinclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether the 
government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than 
disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint. 89
Scalia also noted that California's statute included an exemption 
permitting parents and relatives to purchase violent video games for 
minors, thereby allowing "this dangerous, mind-altering material [to 
wind up] in the hands of children so long as one parent ( or even an aunt 
or uncle) says it's OK."90 This exemption thus guts the effectiveness of 
the law in protecting minors because it affords minors with access to 
supposedly harmful speech, rendering the law, as Scalia concluded, 
"seriously underinclusive."91 In brief, California's statute, although 
85 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (providing that "[o]ne who 
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his 
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person"). 
86 See Clay Calvert et al., Newsgathering Takes Flight in Choppy Skies: Legal Obstacles 
Affecting Journalistic Drone Use, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 535, 570 
(2016) ( arguing that "multiple theories of liability already exist for broadcast journalists who use 
drones to cover news[,]" asserting that "a considerable body of existing tort law already protects 
people who believe they are victims of unlawful journalism[,]" and hoping "that state legislatures, 
driven by fears of a new and unfamiliar technology, will avoid a rush to enact untested and 
possibly extreme legislative solutions to problems that already are susceptible to resolution under 
existing tort doctrine"). 
87 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
88 See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668 (2015) (noting that 
underinclusivness can "reveal that a law does not actually advance a compelling interest[,]" 
particularly where a legislature failed "to regulate vast swaths of conduct that similarly 
diminished" the legislature's asserted interest). 
89 Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 801--02 (2011). 
90 Id. at 802. 
91 Id. 
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possibly well intended, was fatally ineffective in protecting minors 
because minors not only had access to many other varieties of violent 
content that went unregulated, but also because the parental pass­
through provision afforded minors access to precisely the same content 
California feared in the first place. 
In summary, this article's first recommendation-adoption of a 
prism of protection to suss out legislative deficiencies during the 
proposal and drafting processes-is designed to ensure that First 
Amendment interests are not needlessly or recklessly trampled upon. 
The second proposal, set forth below in Part II, affects all adopted 
statutes targeting freedom of expression by requiring inclusion of a 
sunset clause that results in their automatic expiration. 
IL MANDATORY SUNSET CLAUSES: REQUIRING STATUTES TO 
TERMINATE UNLESS THEY ARE REVISITED 
Sunset clauses are far from a new concept in the United States. 
Guido Calabresi, in fact, asserted that "[t]he intellectual history of 
sunset laws is extraordinarily distinguished."92 As one recent article 
explains, "[b]oth Alexander Hamilton and James Madison advocated for 
the use of sunset provisions in particularly controversial forms of 
legislation or thorny policy choices."93 By implication, any law 
affecting a constitutional right such as freedom of speech involves such 
a thorny policy choice. 
A sunset clause generally requires that a law automatically 
terminates at a fixed point in time unless lawmakers choose to formally 
renew it. 94 Scholars Antonios Kouroutakis and Sofia Ranchordas 
explain the importance of these provisions in a 2016 Article, pointing 
out that "[b ]y conferring a temporary character to a law, sunset clauses 
manage legislative inertia since the continued validity of a law will be 
contingent upon a new legislative decision."95 Sunset clauses thus take 
statutes off the books, as it were, when "they are no longer necessary."96 
Furthermore, as Professor John Finn observes, sunset clauses 
"promote democratic oversight and accountability by providing the 
legislature with periodic opportunities to revisit questions with the 
additional information or experience necessary to adjust or to recalibrate 
public policy."97 The clauses thus incentivize assessment by
92 CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 59. 
93 Michael Gentithes, Sunsets on Constitutionality & Supreme Court Efficiency, 21 VA. J. Soc. 
POL'Y & L. 373,384 (2014). 
94 Antonios Kouroutakis & Sofia Ranchordas, Snoozing Democracy: Sunset Clauses, De­
Juridification, and Emergencies, 25 MINN. J. lNT'L L. 29, 33-34 (2016).
95 Id. at 34. 
96 Id. 
97 John E. Finn, Sunset Clauses and Democratic Deliberation: Assessing the Significance of 
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lawmakers,98 with the default position being that "legislation terminates 
on the date of the sunset without some kind of legislative 
reauthorization."99 A tremendous benefit of including sunset clauses in 
statutes, therefore 1s to encourage "legislative oversight and 
updating. " 100
Finally, sunset clauses also are efficient and economically prudent. 
As Yale Law School Professor Y air Listokin asserts, "[ s ]unset clauses 
simply reduce the cost of changing policies in the future. Instead of 
requiring costly effort to change a policy, a sunset clause reverses the 
policy by default. Sunset clauses therefore enhance the reversibility of 
policies."101
This article therefore proposes that all legislation impinging on or 
potentially curtailing the First Amendment freedoms of speech and 
press include language akin to the following: 
This statute shall cease to have effect six years after the date of its 
enactment unless the legislature formally chooses to renew it and 
then only after a complete review of its use, enforcement and impact 
on First Amendment rights, as well as changes in communication 
technologies and social mores, during the prior six years. 
The six-year period is chosen for three reasons. First, six years 
should provide a sufficient amount of time for lawmakers and their 
staffs to view any patterns-possible ebbs and flows-regarding a 
statute's use ( or lack thereof), as well as its real-world benefits and its 
flaws/costs. Second, six years affords a reasonable amount of time for a 
statute to be challenged upon its enactment as unconstitutional at the 
trial court level and then for that case to percolate up through the 
appellate court system. In other words, an appellate court might take 
care of an improvidently drafted statute by disposing of it before the 
six-year period for sunsetting even expires. Third-and related to the 
second reason-is that six years provides ample time for judicial 
interpretation of a statute's terms and language. If such judicial 
interpretation, in tum, does not comport with or match what legislators, 
in fact, intended by a statute's terms, then lawmakers have the 
opportunity to cure those interpretative problems by revising the law to 
clarify its meaning during the renewal process set forth below in Part 
III. 
Ultimately, mandatory inclusion of sunset clauses in all statutes 
Sunset Provisions in Antiterrorism Legislation, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNA T'L L. 442, 44 7 (2010). 
98 See id. ("Sunsets can also encourage policy innovation and legislative learning by creating 
incentives for policy makers to develop mechanisms for policy implementation and 
assessment."). 
99 Id. at 449. 
100 Nim Razook, Obeying Common Law, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 55, 100, n.205 (2009). 
101 Yair Listokin, Leaming Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 535 (2008). 
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that may detrimentally affect expression that is otherwise presumptively 
safeguarded by the First Amendment promotes: (1) the removal of both 
outdated, ineffective and/or seldom-used statutes from code books; and 
(2) legislative oversight for justifying either retention or revisions of
expiring statutes, thereby providing a clear opportunity for lawmakers
to update them to adapt to changing circumstances and to clarify them
in light of judicial interpretations that are discrepant with legislative
intent.
Part III next identifies and fleshes out multiple variables 
lawmakers should consider in deciding whether to renew, revise or 
abandon a statute that sunsets. 
III. THE RENEW-REVISE-OR-ABANDON REVIEW PROCESS: EVALUATING
EXPIRED STATUTES FOR POSSIBLE REIMPLEMENTATION 
Writing in the pages of the Stanford Law Review, Professors 
William Eskridge, Jr. and Philip Frickey observe that "enactment of a 
statute is often the beginning of a significant process of implementation 
by courts or agencies. Implementation changes the statute, because the 
statute must be applied-and often subtly redirected-to meet 
variations of the problem not originally anticipated."102 Indeed, 
inclusion of a mandatory sunset provision in statutes affecting free 
expression forces lawmakers to confront such changes if they want to 
resuscitate or revise their terminated handiwork. This review process is 
critical. 
The legislative decision to renew or amend a statute affecting free 
expression in its current form or, alternatively, to simply abandon it 
altogether, must be based on at least six factors: (1) data tracking the 
frequency of the use of the statute that expired, including the percentage 
of prosecutions under it that were successful; (2) judicial interpretations 
of the statute during the six years since its adoption, focusing on judicial 
recognition of flaws with the statute, as well as differences in its 
meaning as understood by judges from what lawmakers intended; (3) 
significant changes and advancements in communication technologies 
after the adoption of the statute that may affect the statute's continuing 
relevance and its possible future impact on First Amendment speech 
rights; (4) measurable changes, perhaps based on surveys and polls 
conducted by organizations such as the Pew Research Center, in cultural 
values and mores regarding the perceived significance or importance of 
the alleged harm addressed by the statute; (5) judicial decisions from 
other jurisdictions affecting similar laws that, although non-binding, 
102 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning,
42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 359 (1990). 
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may indicate weaknesses with the statute that should be addressed by 
amendments; and (6) shifts in the publically asserted prosecutorial 
agenda of the attorney general or district attorney charged with 
enforcing the law that might militate for or against its future 
deployment. The factors within this sextet are to be considered 
holistically, with no one factor necessarily trumping the others in the 
decision to renew, revise or abandon. 
The first consideration-evaluating data regarding how frequently 
and, in tum, how successfully a statute was used during its six years 
since enactment-taps into two important issues. First, it facilitates 
identification of statutes that are never or very rarely used, thereby 
militating against their renewal. In other words, this criterion can help 
lawmakers to permanently jettison superfluous statutes from their code 
books. Second, in terms of prosecutorial success and failure rates for a 
statute that actually is used, a very low success rate may indicate that a 
law is not achieving its desired end and therefore either should be 
amended or abandoned. 
The second consideration-examining judicial interpretation of a 
statute-is critical for at least two reasons. First, it permits lawmakers 
to determine if courts are interpreting a statute in a manner that is either 
consistent with or different from the way it was originally intended. In 
other words, legislators should search for possible disconnects between 
judicial understanding and their own legislative intent, and then clarify 
their intent through revisions if they decide, in fact, to renew the statute. 
Second, and more obvious, judicial interpretations that declare a statute 
unconstitutional for violating the First Amendment reveal that the law 
should not be renewed unless it is substantially revised to correct the 
constitutional flaw or flaws identified by the judiciary. Leaving 
unconstitutional, and therefore unenforceable, statutes on the books 
benefits no one. 
The third recommendation-that legislators identify changes in 
communication technologies that have transpired since a statute's 
enactment-is particularly important in the digital era for any law 
targeting speech conveyed via a specific medium. As new media arise, 
lawmakers should determine if a statute must be amended to take into 
account such developments and expand the media to which the law 
applies. Put differently, lawmakers would be wise to decide if a 
medium-specific statute should be amended to apply to multiple media 
platforms. 
The fourth recommendation also invites lawmakers to identify 
changes and evolutions, but this time with social mores and cultural 
values instead of communication technologies. If surveys and polls 
from reputable organizations, such as the Pew Research Center or 
established think tanks, suggest that large majorities of people no longer 
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view the problem or harm allegedly caused by speech to be a significant 
issue, then this indicates the statute under review should not be 
renewed. Conversely, if public sentiment continues to view the speech­
caused harm as important or even more so than when the statute was 
initially adopted, this supports its renewal. 
The fifth recommendation-examining court rulings from other 
jurisdictions affecting similar statutes-may help lawmakers to identify 
big-picture trends that indicate the continuing importance ( or lack 
thereof) of their own statute, and to point to weaknesses that require 
amendment should they choose to renew their own statute. Although 
judicial decisions from other jurisdictions, of course, are non-binding, 
they nonetheless should be helpful for lawmakers in comprehending the 
larger legislative landscape beyond their own terrain. Spotting macro­
level judicial trends early, in other words, may help lawmakers within 
their own domain. 
Sixth, and finally, lawmakers should analyze both the publically 
proclaimed and unspoken, yet perceptible, agendas of prosecutors 
charged with enforcing the law that just expired. If prosecutors­
district attorneys and attorneys general-have openly criticized the 
statute or even, perhaps sub silentio, ignored it, this may indicate to 
lawmakers that the statute merits neither renewal nor revision. 
In summary, legislative oversight regarding renewal, revision or 
total abandonment of a statute that has expired under this article's call 
in Part II for the automatic inclusion of a sunset clause in every statute 
that possibly scars First Amendment speech rights must account for 
multiple variables. At minimum, the six criteria offered above provide 
lawmakers with concrete steps for climbing on the way to reaching their 
decision regarding a statute's future. 
CONCLUSION 
The creation of statutes can be viewed in transactional terms, 
featuring "a continuous series of bargains among competing interest 
groups"103 in which the final product constitutes the "agreements 
hammered out by these factions." It is not, however, always a pretty 
process. 104
Indeed, as Columbia University Professor Peter Strauss wittily 
wrote nearly twenty years ago, "However one likes statutes or sausages, 
one should not watch them being made. Here, suspect lobbyists; there, 
103 Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 919,922 
(1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIPP. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988)). 
104 See Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity 
Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 227, 227 (1999) ("Crafting new legislation is like 
watching sausage being made-it isn't pretty."). 
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ambitious staff; in the center, politicians whose eyes are on the prize of 
reelection and the financial support needed to secure it." 105 The 
legislation-as-sausage aphorism traces back, in fact, to nineteenth­
century Prussian ruler Otto Von Bismarck, who declared that "[ n ]o man 
should see how laws or sausages are made."106 
Taking the meaty metaphor one link further, this article offered a 
three-tiered proposal to ensure that First Amendment speech rights 
aren't discarded like rancid scraps on the floor, while statutes 
detrimentally affecting them are pushed through the legislative grinder 
and then linger on in code books and binders of ordinances without an 
expiration date. Regardless of the metaphor that is used to describe its 
creation, the reality, as Professor Ganesh Sitaraman recently wrote, is 
that "[l]egislation is the central feature of the modem American legal 
system."107 First Amendment advocates thus must be involved on the 
front end of the legislative process, not simply on challenging statutes 
once they are enacted. The recommendations here, of course, are not in 
any way guaranteed to work. 
To wit, the most glaring weakness is that the recommendations 
simply may be ignored. Indeed, lawmakers proposing and drafting 
statutes that affect free expression may be motivated by a wide range of 
forces that trump any and all concern for constitutionality and civil 
rights. Indeed, it has been argued "that legislative drafting is inherently 
political."108 As legal scholar Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov writes: 
Legislators' motivation to create policy is derived from a wide range 
of personal goals. In addition to ideology and a desire to make good 
public policy, the motivation to create policy is also induced by a 
desire to be an influential policymaker, to exhibit institutional power 
and increase one's prestige, to claim credit and satisfy constituents, 
and to attract financial support from interest groups. 109
Additionally, a possible weakness with the third proposal proffered 
in this article relates simply to the amount of time it would take to 
comprehensively review, after a six-year existence, the usefulness of a 
statute affecting free speech that has sunsetted. Professor Edward 
Imwinkelried asserted in 2005 that "[ w ]hen American statutes were few 
in number, it was feasible for the legislatures to monitor their legislation 
l05 Peter L. Strauss, Essay, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 240 (1998). 
l06 See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749 F.2d 50, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (attributing the quote to 
Bismarck); see also Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure of Legislative Methodology, 
62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1282, 1283 (1994) ("Bismarck once said that there are two things you do not 
want to witness being made: one is sausage, the other is legislation."). 
101 Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 80 (2015). 
l08 David A. Marcello, The Ethics and Politics of Legislative Drafting, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2437, 
2439 (1996). 
109 Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & MARYL. REV. 805, 841 (2010). 
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and periodically revisit the statutes to update them. However, today the 
sheer number of statutes precludes comprehensive monitoring by 
legislatures. "110
On the other hand, inclusion of a six-year sunset clause in every 
piece of legislation threatening, either indirectly or directly, First 
Amendment free-speech rights is incredibly simple to embrace. First 
Amendment rights are facilitated by such clauses because the default 
position, as it were, is for a law to expire on its accord, thus quite 
literally freeing speech. The burden then shifts to lawmakers-not to 
First Amendment advocates-to be proactive if they want a law to stay 
on the books. 
Ultimately, the process of legislative drafting-unlike the various 
methods of legislative interpretation-is understudied.111 A 2015 
article, for instance, observed that "[t]extbook and even scholarly 
understandings of the legislative process rarely investigate the origins of 
legislative drafts." 112 As Professor Eric Gauvin elaborates: 
Legal scholars have been slow to give the subject of legislative 
methodology the attention it deserves. Although statutes cover much 
of the legal landscape and have to a great degree eclipsed the 
common law in importance, most legal scholarship still focuses on 
the judge's art, rather than the legislative drafter's art.113
Indeed, Gouvin's strategic use of the word "art"-rather, 
perhaps, than "science"-suggests an inherent amount of malleability in 
the drafting of legislation. Yet it was legal luminary Roscoe Pound, 114 
"the most notable judicial law reformer"115 of the twentieth century, 
who boldly predicted more than one century ago in the pages of the 
Harvard Law Review that: 
110 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A More Modest Proposal Than A Common Law for the Age of 
Statutes: Greater Reliance in Statutory Interpretation on the Concept of Interpretative Intention, 
68 ALB. L. REV. 949, 949 (2005). 
111 See James R. Maxeiner, Legal lndetenninacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and the 
Rule of Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 517, 528 (2006) ("While scholarly interest in statutes has 
recently increased dramatically, the new literature of statutes is largely limited to political process 
and statutory interpretation. It pays little attention to how legislatures should write rules.") 
(emphasis added). 
112 Sitaraman, supra note 107, at 91. 
113 Gouvin, supra note 106, at 1284. 
114 Pound was "dean of Harvard Law School and a seminal voice in the growth of law as a 
profession in America." Jon M. Garon, Minnesota Reflections on a Century of Change and 
Stasis: Roscoe Pound's Visit to St. Paul, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 489, 489 (2007). Additionally, 
Pound "served as President of the Association of American Law Schools and of the International 
Society of Comparative Law, and was the recipient of seventeen honorary degrees." Michael I. 
Swygert, Dean Roscoe Pound Speaks at VU, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 873, 875 (2004). 
115 Paul D. Carrington, The Obsolescence of the United States Courts of Appeals: Roscoe 
Pound's Structural Solution, 15 J.L. & POL. 515, 525 (1999). 
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there is coming to be a science of legislation and that modem statutes 
are not to be disposed of lightly as off-hand products of a crude 
desire to do something, but represent long and patient study by 
experts, careful consideration by conferences or congresses or 
associations, press discussions in which public opinion is focused 
upon all important details, and hearings before legislative 
committees.116 
This Article, of course, has not proposed anything close to an 
empirical science of legislation. Yet, it has proffered three specific, 
fundamental ways that legislation affecting First Amendment rights 
might be improved by adding greater structure and more rigorous 
consideration to the process, as well as ongoing legislative oversight. 
The three-tiered framework offered here thus hopefully marks a small 
step forward, at least where a fundamental civil liberty such as free 
speech is concerned, in the direction of what esteemed professor and 
former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde once crisply called 
"rational lawmaking[. ]"l l 7
116 Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 384 (1907-1908) 
(emphasis added). 
111 Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197,222 (1975). 
